Syria crisis raises security concerns for Iraq, says government spox Bassem Al-Awadi

BAGHDAD — Iraq had no prior knowledge of the fall of Bashar Al-Assad’s regime, government spokesperson Bassem Al-Awadi stated in an interview with Al Iraqiya, underscoring the country’s efforts to “mediate” a resolution to Syria’s crisis.

The spokesperson expressed concerns shared by all parties involved in Syria, particularly the potential resurgence of extremism and terrorism by armed groups, which could pose threats to Iraq’s security. Al-Awadi stressed that Iraq remains committed to a balanced approach, refraining from supporting any group or faction and leaving decisions about Syria’s future to its people. He also warned against the risks of ethnic or religious clashes in Syria spilling over into Iraq.

Excerpts from Al-Awadi’s interview with Al Iraqiya TV:

In response to whether Iraq was aware (in advance of the fall of Bashar Al-Assad’s regime): Absolutely not, as evidenced by the mediation project proposed by the Prime Minister in 2023, his meeting with Bashar Al-Assad, and Iraq’s active role in bringing Syria back to the Arab League. This includes the fact that, in 2023 and 2024, Prime Minister Al-Sudani spoke with former Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad three times, attempting to convince him that circumstances had changed and become more difficult, emphasizing the need for dialogue and a new political process.

The message we were trying to convey to Assad was that the equations are changing, and it was time for Syria to open up to others, particularly to establish a clear arrangement between Syria and Turkey. This was before October 7. Bashar Al-Assad rejected this and did not respond to other mediators. There was a certain rigidity in understanding the ideas presented and the changes on the ground.

However, the same mediation we proposed just hours before Bashar Al-Assad’s departure reflected Iraq’s desire to gather the conflicting parties at a dialogue table, including the Assad regime and Turkey. Syrian Foreign Minister Bassam Al-Sabbagh responded, saying it came too late.

It wasn’t the Iraqi initiative that was late but rather the solution proposed by Iraq, which was the only possible last-minute solution: moving towards a new political equation and facilitating a meeting between the Syrian government, opposition parties, Turkey, and the Western community, with all stakeholders present. It was important to create a movement leading to a new political equation. This dialogue took place in Doha, but frankly, by the time the three foreign ministers arrived there, the matters had already been concluded.

The sanctions on Saddam Hussein’s regime lasted from 1991 to 2003, a span of 13 years. Similarly, the period of sanctions and popular rejection in Syria has also lasted 13 years. After such a prolonged period, it becomes impossible to sustain resilience, especially without public and popular support for the battle. Resistance becomes unfeasible, given the financial situation and sanctions. How can you ask a soldier earning $5–7 or a Chief of Staff earning $150 to keep fighting? This long period of popular rejection and lack of enthusiasm closely mirrors what happened in Iraq in 2002–2003, when even the staunchest circles surrounding the former regime disintegrated and leaned towards a resolution. There was a kind of simulation of the final moments, hours, and conditions in terms of sanctions and Syrian popular rejection.

There were perceptions of a potential role Iraq could play. Were there internal or external parties trying to push Iraq into this war? Yes, there were such demands, but Iraq, under the decisive national decision of the Prime Minister, chose a political, diplomatic, and humanitarian role. The circumstances were no longer supportive; this was not 2014. These were not pressures but rather requests and desires for Iraq, framed as “Is it possible?” Iraq was clear and straightforward in its response, emphasizing its rejection of military intervention while expressing readiness to pursue a political path to help resolve the crisis.

It is not just Iraq that harbors concerns; our diplomatic sources and the Prime Minister’s teams indicate that all parties, including those who believe they are making progress, share certain fears.

In summary, all parties involved in Syria have some level of concern. Our primary and greatest concern, which we hope will be alleviated, is the potential resurgence of extremism and terrorism by some armed groups. These groups might believe it is time to reintroduce extremism and terrorism, potentially targeting Iraq or collaborating with entities within Iraq. Alternatively, there could be plans and projects supported from abroad to use terrorist groups against Iraq.

I will reiterate the famous phrase echoed by senior politicians today: “We judge actions, not words.” The past, for us and others, is not a basis for judgment. Do not judge me for 2014–2015; if you do, I will judge you for your past actions. We are focused on the present and extend an olive branch to the changes that have occurred in Syria and to all parties. We will not support one side against another in Syria, nor will we align with one group against another. We will not provide funding, military, or intelligence support to any group. We leave the decision to the Syrian people.

Iraq’s second concern is the potential mistreatment of Syrian minorities. If certain groups engage in such actions, ethnic or religious clashes could impact discourse and behavior within Iraq.

We are not worried about security repercussions, as Iraq remains an active member of the international coalition formed to defeat ISIS in Iraq and Syria. This coalition is still operational, with plans and resources prepared. The coalition’s recent message to Iraq is clear: Iraq’s security is integral to the coalition’s security. Any force considering advancing into Iraq from any direction will face devastating resistance from Iraqis and coalition forces.