PKK members attend the group’s 12th Congress, where the decision was announced to dissolve its organizational structure and end its armed struggle against the Turkish state. Photo by ANF NEWS, a media outlet close to the PKK
Historic congress held today
PKK’s promised dissolution raises questions over next phase of Kurdish politics
NEWSROOM — The announcement by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK, that it is to dissolve itself has triggered widespread debate over the feasibility of such a move and its broader implications across the region.
The PKK maintains complex political, military and economic networks across Iraq, Syria, Iran, Turkey and Europe. In Iraq, its fighters are entrenched in mountainous areas such as Qandil, Metina, Gara, Avashin and Haftanin — regions no state authority has fully controlled. These rugged fronts have historically witnessed small Peshmerga units holding off large, helicopter-supported military campaigns.
The first major question is how any withdrawal from these areas would occur. Would PKK fighters surrender to the Kurdistan Regional Government? To federal authorities in Baghdad? Or to United States forces?
This leads to another sensitive issue: the fate of the 138 Turkish military posts established in Iraqi Kurdistan to pursue PKK elements. Ankara’s long-standing military footprint complicates any future disengagement.
Particularly in Qandil, the PKK’s presence has been shaped by regional understandings. Iran reportedly tolerated the group’s position in exchange for a cessation of operations by PJAK, its Iranian Kurdish affiliate. The arrangement, reportedly brokered by former Iraqi President Jalal Talabani and involving the Syrian regime of Bashar Assad, helped cement the PKK’s position in the area.
In 2011, Assad’s withdrawal from Kurdish areas in Syria allowed the Democratic Union Party to assume control. The party’s armed wings, the People’s Protection Units and the Women’s Protection Units, later became the backbone of the Syrian Democratic Forces, which defeated ISIS in Kobani with U.S. support. Arab tribal forces from eastern Syria were incorporated into the SDF, creating a broader coalition acceptable to Washington.
Throughout this period, SDF commander Mazloum Abdi sought to politically distance himself from the PKK and open new ties, particularly with Kurdish leader Masoud Barzani. The historic meeting between Abdi and Barzani took place not long before Ocalan’s call for peace and, later, call for disarmament.
Should Abdi now decisively break with the PKK and its affiliated groups—most notably the Democratic Union Party and PJAK—the dissolution could strengthen his long-term leadership. How these groups respond publicly in the coming days will signal the direction of events.
In Turkey, the situation is somewhat clearer. Öcalan retains deep loyalty among his followers, akin to the influence wielded by cleric Muqtada Al-Sadr in Iraq. The Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party provides a legal political platform for Kurdish interests within Turkey’s system.
In Europe, where the PKK is tied into economic networks registered under individual names, any dismantling will likely prove difficult.
Ultimately, the seriousness of the dissolution—and its acceptance—may hinge on the Turkish government’s response.
Ankara faces a pivotal choice: treat former PKK members as repentant criminals, subject to legal action, or seize the moment to revive political dialogue, as briefly attempted between 2013 and 2015.
So far, the Turkish government has issued no clear position. Its decision will likely determine whether this marks the end of a decades-long conflict or merely a rebranding of the PKK under new structures.
In Iraq, one other unresolved issue remains: the fate of the Sinjar Resistance Units. The PKK’s presence in Sinjar, a region shaped by its own complex demographics and security realities, poses unique challenges that dissolution alone may not resolve.
