Writer and academic Faris Harram: Iraq a democracy in name only

BAGHDAD — In an interview, Iraqi writer and academic Faris Harram criticized Iraq’s post-2003 political system as fundamentally self-contradictory, claiming it enshrines democracy in its constitution but fails to uphold democratic principles in practice. Harram argued that both religious and secular political parties lack genuine democratic frameworks, warning that growing restrictions on freedoms and revival of past repressive measures could lead to renewed protests nationwide.

Excerpts from Faris Harram’s interview with Dijlah TV:

We hope that the statement from the religious authority was intended for elites in the broad sense—opinion leaders, academics, and those addressing public affairs—rather than the political elite, as the media machinery of the latter seeks to promote.

The post-2003 system is inherently self-contradictory; it claims to be democratic, enshrining democracy in the constitution, but in practice, none of this is evident. This is the fundamental contradiction within the system—it contradicts its own constitutional text.

The political system is built on two paradoxes. The first is its nominal democracy; every single party—let me underscore, every party—that has governed since 2003 is undemocratic, does not believe in democracy, and is fundamentally disconnected from it. Religious parties do not incorporate democratic principles and operate solely on the basis of obedience. Meanwhile, the other parties claiming secularism are led by the same individuals since their inception, with no democratic mechanisms for managing internal party life.

The second paradox is the contradiction between legal texts in the courts on rights and freedoms, which rely on Baath-era legislation, and the later constitutional texts guaranteeing freedoms, expression, protest, and access to information. This contradiction drags Iraq back to its dictatorial past.

If political forces wish to increase the likelihood of the system’s collapse, they need only continue enacting repressive laws and legislation that contradict the constitution. As levels of repression in any system increase, so do the chances of its collapse.

The reasons and factors that sparked protests remain in place in Iraqi society. The economy is controlled by armed groups, and unemployment is addressed with random decisions, which closes off opportunities for young Iraqis. Additionally, merchants are forced to pay fees and taxes outside the official tax system.

The most notable criticism of the Sudani government is its fervent drive to restrict freedoms over the past two years, a response to the October 2019 protests, through passing repressive legislation in parliament or adding amendments, alongside campaigns of persecution and restrictions—particularly the ‘indecent content’ campaign, which lacks constitutional basis and aims to revive laws from Saddam Hussein’s regime.

Currently, concepts like ‘public taste,’ ‘public morals,’ ‘state reputation,’ and ‘reputation of officials’ are being revived, with possible legislation based on these ideas. Today, some ministries are issuing directives that prohibit criticism of ‘state symbols,’ effectively a return to the Saddam era in practice.

I am not speaking solely about Sudani; previous prime ministers have also made economically disastrous decisions, such as expanding public sector jobs to accommodate thousands of new graduates. The real solution lies in opening safe investment opportunities—not investments under the threat of arms and intimidation.

The political class’s refusal to listen to the public and its tendency to label critics as agents of foreign embassies or Zionists strongly indicates the likelihood of renewed protests. When you don’t listen, people become angry. As poverty spreads, state mismanagement prevails, and the line between arms and politics blurs, conditions for a failed state are complete, creating public frustration and paving the way for a new Tishreen Protests.

The political class is paving the way for protests even stronger and more intense than those of Tishreen. While we do not wish for this outcome, hoping instead that the political class awakens and reconsiders its actions, I don’t believe they ever will.

Muqtada Al-Sadr read the situation early, saving himself and his movement from a major contradiction that could have cost him significant public support. He mobilized his followers not only for elections but for reform as well. When he reached a deadlock, he chose to withdraw rather than involve his supporters in a project with reformist slogans but non-reformist outcomes. This was a very wise decision politically, despite its severe impact on the daily workings of parliament.