Carnegie Fellow Harith Hasan predicts economic pressures driving shifts in Iraqi ‘resistance’ factions

NEWSROOM — Harith Hasan, a non-resident fellow at the Carnegie Middle East Center, presented  analysis on regional developments and the potential challenges Iraq might face.

He suggested that Iraqi “resistance factions” could divide into two groups: “pragmatists,” who would adopt more rational and flexible approaches, and “ideologues,” who would maintain rigid, uncompromising stances.

Hasan emphasized that U.S. influence in Iraq is not tied solely to its military presence but is significantly linked to economic leverage. He also predicted that Iran might be willing to negotiate over Iraqi factions if it perceives that Iraq is facing sanctions, as this could have a direct impact on the situation inside Iran.

Excerpts from Harith Hasan’s interview with Ahmad Albashir on DW Arabic’s Albasheer Show

Oct. 7 changed the nature of the behavior of dominant powers in the region. Previously, Iran was described as a “radical” force seeking change in the region, while Israel was described as a “conservative” power that wanted to maintain the status quo. However, this has completely shifted. Iran has now become a “conservative” force that wants to return to the old rules of engagement, while Israel has become a “radical” force that does not want to return to the pre-Gaza War situation and is seeking a fundamental change in the region.

Iran does not want war, and until the recent strike, its behavior signaled that it was not ready for combat, especially with the presence of an Israeli government prepared to make high levels of sacrifices and the possibility of dragging the United States into the conflict. Additionally, with the rise of an Iranian president associated with the reformist camp, Iran’s strategic deterrence lacked credibility until the moment of the missile attack.

For the first time, Tehran realizes that it faces a threat to the very existence of the Iranian regime. In previous stages, groups affiliated with it took on the task of confronting the Israelis and Americans. However, after Israel completes its confrontation with Hamas, and following the severe blows Hezbollah has suffered, along with the emerging perception that Hezbollah could be quickly eliminated, Iran now believes it is ready to accept new rules of engagement in the region. These rules could end the era of using armed factions, or what we call “non-state actors.”

The idea of “alliances” has been significantly disrupted, though it has not yet ended. Syria is the weakest link in the Iranian axis because the Syrian regime’s goal is “survival” rather than “resistance.” A strong blow to the Syrian regime could lead to fragmentation of the route stretching from Iran to Lebanon, and with increased pressure, Assad’s regime could change its stance. This may be related to the major security breaches Hezbollah has recently faced.

It might be premature to say that the Iraqi factions have learned their lesson, but a new reality is beginning to take shape in the region. Decisions about its future will be made in Tehran, and in Baghdad as well, as these factions need the cover of the Iraqi government, despite being ideological groups invested in the idea of “resistance.” Their existence is tied to the idea of perpetual war, and the same applies to Hezbollah in Lebanon.

Some elements within the ruling Coordination Framework understand that the behavior of the armed factions is “suicidal” and could backfire on the future of the political forces themselves. However, they exist in a state of mutual benefit. Political parties need the presence of armed factions for internal repression, leading to a duality between the constitution and a constant readiness for civil war.

The duality within the Coordination Framework forces prevents the building of institutions, development, and good governance. It strengthens a parallel state that erodes the legitimate state from within. Without this duality, Iraq would have had a great opportunity to play a significant role in this regional crisis due to its unique relationships with Iran. However, it lacks a unified voice and fails to control weapons under the framework of state monopoly over legitimate violence.

The armed factions in Iraq are not “resistance projects,” but they invest in this idea because their projects are “projects of power.” One former prime minister told a foreign researcher that the Popular Mobilization Forces are a force to protect the post-2003 regime.

The current crisis in the region could lead to a split between “pragmatists” and “ideologues” within the structure of the armed factions. Pragmatism dictates rational choices for factions with the largest share of power, while ideologues will insist on their rigid positions. This will make it easier to defeat them later, as their vulnerabilities will be exposed, especially since they are the smaller part of the faction structure.

Iraq’s situation is entirely chaotic due to the populist one-upmanship between the Coordination Framework and the Sadrist Movement, and the competition between the armed factions themselves over which is more committed to the principle of “resistance.” This has caused Iraq to miss a major opportunity to play a role in the region and has cost Iran a better negotiating position with the West.

American influence in Iraq does not stem from the presence of its military bases but from its economic leverage, control over the flow of hard currency, and pressure on the energy and gas import file from Iran, as it has done in the past. However, this pressure will be greater this time, as Iraq will be a priority, and there will not be circumstances similar to those of the COVID-19 pandemic.

The Iraqi government cannot curb the armed factions, but it holds the negotiating card with them and with Tehran. The scenario of Iraq facing U.S. sanctions could be a reason for Iran to agree to negotiate on the issue of the factions, as sanctions would eventually harm Iran as well. This will determine the U.S. administration’s stance on Iraq after the elections.